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A Question of Delegation: The
Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 and State-
Federal Relations. An Inquiry
Into the Success With Which Congress





"The bureaucracy has consistently thwarted the will of Con-
gress by drafting regulations that go far beyond congressional in-
tent."' The charge that executive branch agencies have run amuck
in exercising their discretionary powers, as they implement congres-
sional initiatives, provides a major source of tension within the fed-
eral government and feeds a growing national concern over the role
of regulation in modem American society.' In suggesting a wide
range of reforms, commentators have generally focused upon the
two sources of administrative power, the agency and Congress, to
elucidate techniques for restraining agency discretion.
First, the major reexamination of the role and legitimacy of the
independent regulatory agencies-the fourth branch of govern-
ment-results from a loss of faith in the independent expert, who
initially provided the reason to develop independent agencies. "Un-
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1. 125 CONG. REC. S. 12150 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1979) (statement of Senator Domenici).
2. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, MAJOR REGULATORY INITIATIVE DURING
1980--THE AGENCIES, THE COURTS, THE CONGRESS (1981).
less we make the requirements for administrative action strict and
demanding, expertise, the strength of modern government, can be-
come a monster which rules with no practical limits on its discretion.
Absolute discretion, like corruption, marks the beginning of the end
of liberty."3 The nature of the independent expert, as a combiner of
the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of government, has
subjected independent regulatory agencies to close scrutiny in the
expectation that a better understanding of their decision-making
process and regulatory impact would suggest new solutions to the
problem of restraining executive power.4 This examination has
yielded few results other than a strong reluctance in the legislative
and executive branches to create new independent regulatory agen-
cies or to give the existing agencies additional authority.5 The nega-
tive attitude of the legislative and executive branches toward
independent regulatory agencies suggests that further focus on the
actions taken by agencies will not aid the goal of controlling the
growth of administrative discretion. By rejecting the creation of new
independent agencies in favor of establishing executive agencies re-
sponsible to the President, Congress has not cured any of the
problems identified with the independent agency. Similar goals,
functions, and procedures apply to all regulatory agencies regardless
of "independence" and have at their base wide uses of discretion.
The second focus of the examination of agency discretion has
been upon congressional delegation of power to the executive
branch. After a flurry of judicial attention some forty years ago,6
courts have since paid little attention to the delegation question. A
number of cases have questioned whether Congress unconstitution-
ally delegated an overly broad grant of power to the executive
branch in a series of regulatory statutes. The clear trend in these
cases favors broad delegation.7 Recently, however, commentators,
including a number of members of the judiciary,8 have suggested
that stricter application of constitutional precepts could force Con-
gress to provide more precise standards for the exercise of delegated
authority, imposing a limit on executive abuse.9
3. New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882, 884 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
4. Friendly, The FederalAdministrative Agencies - The Needfor Better Definition of Stan-
dards, 76 HARV. L. REV. 858 (1962).
5. See AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, MAJOR REGULATORY INITIATIVES DURING
1980--THE AGENCIES, THE COURTS, THE CONGRESS (1981).
6. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref.
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
7. See, e.g., Jakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). See also I B. MEZINE, J. STEIN
& J. GUIFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 3.03(4) (1982).
8. McGowan, Congress, Courts and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
1119 (1979); Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575 (1972).
9. When Congress is too divided or uncertain to articulate policy, it is no doubt
easier to pass an organic statute with some vague language about the 'public interest'
which tells the agency, in effect, to get the job done. . . . An argument for letting the
Criticism of overly broad delegations of legislative authority is
not confined to the academic and judicial worlds. Several congress-
men have added their voices to those suggesting that the problem of
unrestrained agency discretion can be controlled through more pre-
cise legislative direction.' ° Unfortunately, difficult issues usually
provide the catalyst for broad delegation of authority. Creating an
independent agency allows Congress to pass the buck to others" and
appease constituents through affirmative action in passing legisla-
tion. Also, when the rules and regulations promulgated by the
agency become oppressive, congressmen can stand back and charge
that the agency has distorted the intention of Congress. 2
The increased mandatory requirements and detail that charac-
terize current legislation in the regulatory field indicate a renewed
attention to the delegation question. 3 This trend stands in marked
contrast to earlier legislation, in which the usual congressional defi-
nition of regulatory purpose was "to promote the public interest,"
with the "details left to the administrative agencies to work out."' 4
The Surface Mining Reclamation and Control Act of 197715
(SMCRA) is a contemporary example of congressional activity that
produced an enormously detailed legislative product. The Act im-
posed highly restrictive standards on the coal mining industry, and
also provided mandatory and detailed instructions to the responsible
federal agency and to the states regarding implementation of the
statute.
Complex and difficult issues arise in the regulation of coal min-
ing, particularly pursuant to a state-federal partnership, and various
interest groups fought an arduous battle to enact the Surface Mining
Act. The resultant statutory example of detailed delegation, how-
ever, does not support the proposition that such constrained delega-
tion satisfactorily directs the exercise of executive power. While
evaluating the assumption that delegations of authority to an agency
should be specifically stated, this article also examines the proposi-
tion that regulatory agencies inevitably go beyond the boundaries of
experts decide when the people's representatives are uncertain or cannot agree is an
argument for paternalism and against democracy.
Wright, supra note 8, at 584-85. See also Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New Deal Coal
and the Clean AirAct, 89 YALE L.J. 1466 (1980).
10. See generally McGowan, supra note 8.
11. 112 CONG. REC. H. 20,685 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976), reprinted in McGowan, supra
note 8, at 1129 n.39.
12. 122 CONG. REC. H. 10,673 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (remarks by Rep. Flowers),
reprinted in McGowan, supra note 8, at 1130 n.42.
13. See Resources Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987;
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7481-7642 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
14. Wright, supra note 8, at 585.
15. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. III 1979).
their enabling authority and create additional and unnecessary woes
for the regulated industries and the American public.
II. The Statutory Scheme of SMCRA
Detailed statements of congressional intention, astounding com-
plexity, and significant rigidity characterize the SMCRA. The legis-
lative history supports the contention that problems in defining the
delegation of congressional authority to both federal and state agen-
cies and the difficulty of promulgating technical methods of control-
ling the adverse impacts from mining coal caused the complex and
detailed nature of this statute. 16 While Congress clearly desired to
adopt detailed performance standards in order to redress past abuses
of coal mining, it also wished to provide federal and state agencies
with precise instructions to insure implementation and enforcement
of those standards. The Act's complexity also derived from repeated
congressional attention given some issues over the course of seven
years; seven years of congressional attention produced legislative
language approaching the style of talmudic scholarship.
The SMCRA achieves the regulatory purpose of controlling the
adverse effects of stripping coal through its design for federal-state
relations. Concern that congressional directives had been ignored
emanated from the apparent failure of the Department of Interior to
successfully implement the congressionally mandated state-federal
relationship. 7 Each of the major substantive issues that the drafters
faced and subsequently resolved, such as the design of the enforce-
ment program or the detailed performance standards, had an impact
on the proposed legislative fit between the federal and state govern-
ments. In reality, the difficulty encountered in implementing the
state-federal relationship found its genesis in other substantive goals
established by Congress. Furthermore, the fact that Congress stated
the state-federal relationship and substantive requirements of SM-
CRA in great statutory detail ultimately precluded the agency from
developing acceptable accommodations through regulations or prag-
matic actions.
The SMCRA established for the first time a comprehensive fed-
eral regulatory program to control the adverse environmental effects
of both surface coal mining and deep coal mining.' 8 The substantial
importance of the coal industry to the nation underlies this regula-
tory program. In 1983, projections indicate that the industry will
produce over 800 million tons of coal which will supply nearly
16. See infra notes 57-115 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 116-189 and accompanying text.
18. See E. IMHOFF, A GUIDE TO STATE PROGRAMS FOR THE RECLAMATION OF SURFACE
MINED AREAS, U.S.G.S. CIRCULAR 731, RESOURCES AND LAND INVESTIGATIONS PROGRAM
[RALI] (1976).
twenty percent of the total national energy needs and forty-four per-
cent of the electricity. Approximately 17,000 coal mines and other
facilities associated with the processing and handling of the mined
coal will account for this production. 9 Over 2,000 separate business
entities engage in coal mining, from the smallest "mom and pop"
operations to the largest Fortune "500" industrial corporations or
subsidiaries of such corporations. Nearly thirty states across the na-
tion mine coal, with the largest concentration in the Appalachian
states, the midwestern states, and the Rocky Mountain states.2 °
The Surface Mining Act has two major components: a program
for reclaiming abandoned mined lands, established by Title IV;2
and a regulatory program for current and future mining, set forth in
Title V.22 The abandoned mined lands program restores lands dam-
aged by past mining through expenditures made over fifteen years
from a fund capitalized by a fee on each ton of currently produced
coal.23 Importantly, the federal government must conduct the aban-
doned mined lands program without participation by the states until
such time as a state has an approved regulatory program under Title
V. 24 After that time, the state may control up to one-third of the
funds collected from the coal mined in that state. Congress con-
ceived Title IV as an inducement to state participation in the regula-
tory program as well as a means of restoring previously mined lands.
Title V defines the regulatory program for coal mining to be
implemented by the states and the federal government. The pro-
gram consists of five different elements.
First, Title V establishes a comprehensive scheme of environ-
mental performance standards. These standards include the basic
criteria with which mining must comply to assure protection of the
land, water, and air resources adversely affected by mining activities.
Section 515 of SMCRA, for example, sets forth the following re-
quirements: restoration of the mined land to its approximate pre-
mining original contour;25 minimization of the disturbance to the hy-
drologic balance and to the quantity and quality of water;26 restora-
tion of the land's capability to support pre-mining land uses.27
Section 515 also provides specific standards applicable to steep slope
19. OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF INTERIOR, BUDGET JUSTIFI-
CATION FY 1893, 11-12, R7 (1982).
20. See H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 74-75 (1977).
21. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1231-1243 (Supp. 111 1979).
22. Id §§ 1231-1279.
23. Id §§ 1231-1243.
24. Id
25. Id § 1265(b)(3). The constitutionality of this section was recently upheld in Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981).
26. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(10) (Supp. III 1979).
27. Id § 1265(b)(2).
and mountain-top-removal mining practices.28
Title V further mandates a comprehensive application, permit,
and bonding scheme to insure the gathering and evaluation of ade-
quate information about the mining site before any mining takes
place. This information must be considered whether or not the pro-
posed mining and reclamation practices will cause environmental
harm during mining and whether or not the land can be restored to
support its pre-mining uses.29 No permit. may be issued unless the
applicant makes, and the regulatory authority confirms, an affirma-
tive demonstration of the information required by SMCRA.30 Even
after the operator completes mining he must keep a bond posted
with the regulatory authority to assure the availability of some re-
sources to maintain a successful reclamation plan.3'
The third element of Title V establishes a procedure for states
that wish to implement the regulatory program. These states must
submit a proposed plan for approval to the Office of Surface Mining
in the Department of the Interior (OSM). 32 If OSM finds that the
plan meets the requirements of the Surface Mining Act and if the
state implements regulations by the Secretary of the Interior, then
the state assumes from OSM the primary jurisdiction for implement-
ing Title V. If OSM does not approve the plan or if the state submits
no plan, then the Department of the Interior must implement a fed-
eral regulatory program in the state that preempts any existing state
program.33
Title V also outlines an inspection and enforcement scheme to
be implemented both by OSM and any state wishing to have an ap-
proved state plan. Extremely detailed requirements make the in-
spection and enforcement scheme particularly notable.34 If any
inspector finds any violation of SMCRA or Department of Interior
regulations at a mine-site, he must at least issue a notice of viola-
tion.35 If the violation constitutes an imminent danger to the public
or to the environment, the inspector must issue a cessation order that
may shut down all or part of the mining operation.36 Furthermore, a
pattern of violations resulting from the unwarranted failure to com-
ply will cause suspension or revocation of the permit.37 Addition-
28. Id. § 1265(c)-1265(e). Since promulgation of the interim regulations on December
13, 1977, numerous judicial decisions have addressed these and other performance standards
of SMCRA.
29. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1256-1258 (Supp. III 1979).
30. 1d. § 1260.
31. Id. § 1259.
32. Id § 1253.
33. Id § 1254.
34. Id §§ 1267, 1268, 1270, 1271.
35. 1d § 1271(a)(3).
36. Id § 127 1(a)(2).
37. Id § 1271 (a)(4).
ally, civil penalties may be assessed for any violation in an amount
corresponding to the seriousness of the violation.3 1 Violations can
also result in criminal penalties and civil actions.39 Citizen requests
to the regulatory authority can trigger the inspection and enforce-
ment procedures.4 °
Title V establishes a process by which the regulatory authority
may designate certain lands as unsuitable for mining.4' Thus, if
lands may not be reclaimed, the agency must designate the lands as
unsuitable for mining.42 Also, if mining would be inconsistent with
land use plans, adversely affect fragile or historic lands, or affect re-
newable resources or natural hazards, the agency may designate the
land as unsuitable for mining.43 Finally, Title V absolutely prohibits
mining in certain specially designated areas, including national
parks and forests, or within three hundred feet of a dwelling.44
Congress set forth in the statute a precise timetable for the vari-
ous elements of the SMCRA to become operative. The permit, ap-
plication, and bonding provisions, and the designation of lands
unsuitable for mining procedures are not to be implemented until an
approved state program or a federal program for a state exists.45
SMCRA provides that states should submit proposed programs to
the Department of the Interior no later than eighteen months after
the passage of the Act, or twenty-four months if the state needs addi-
tional time for state legislative action.46 The Secretary of the Interior
must approve or disapprove of the state program within six months
of its submission by the state.47 If disapproved, the state may resub-
mit a revised plan within two months, with final action by the Secre-
tary of the revision due two months later.48 If a state program is not
approved by June 3, 1980, then SMCRA requires the Secretary of
the Interior to implement a federal program in that state.49 Within
eight months of the approval of a state program or the implementa-
tion of a federal program, all mining operations must comply with
all provisions of Title V.5° At the maximum, the full regulatory pro-
gram of Title V would not become effective until thirty-four months
after passage of SMCRA. A wide variety of factors, including delays
38. Id 1268(a).
39. Id §§ 1268(e), 1268(g), 1271(c).
40. Id § 1271(a).
41. Id § 1272.
42. Id § 1272(a)(2).
43. Id § 1272(a)(3).
44. Id § 1272(e).
45. Id § 1252(d).
46. Id §§ 1253(a), 1254(a).
47. Id § 1253(b).
48. Id § 1253(c).
49. Id § 1254(a).
50. Id § 1256(a).
in promulgating regulations, excessive time required for submittal of
state programs, and litigation over critical issues, prevented the
achievement of the schedule for implementing full regulatory pro-
grams in each state. At this time, eight states have not effected the
permanent program. In seven of these states, litigation preventing
the imposition of such programs has caused the delay. The
probability of a federal program exists in Georgia, and federal coal
exploration programs have been proposed for Washington, Oregon,
Massachusetts, Michigan, and Rhode Island.5
Congress adopted a more expeditious implementation schedule
for certain of the performance standards and the inspection and en-
forcement provisions of the Surface Mining Act. Congress consid-
ered a thirty-four month delay after passage of the Act as
inconsistent with the importance of certainty of the performance
standards of section 515.52 Therefore, Congress established an in-
terim program, to be run by the state, implementing section 515.11
The interim program of section 515 standards became effective for
new mines on February 3, 1978 and for all mining operations on
May 3, 1978. 5' This interim program establishes a national regula-
tory system under which the state permitting process existing prior to
the passage of the Surface Mining Act continues to authorize mining
in conjunction with certain additional federal standards. During the
interim program, operations are subject to federal enforcement and
inspection in addition to that carried out by the states.
As the Department of the Interior moved in 1977 to develop the
programs giving life to SMCRA, its essential task was to implement
the disparate elements of Title V as a logical whole within the tight
timetables established by Congress. This task inevitably required
the federal agency to confront several tensions inherent in SMCRA.
The most important tension was between the proposed state-federal
relationship and the detailed performance standards.
III. Legislative History of SMCRA
The legislative history of SMCRA stretches over a decade.
Representative Morris K. Udall, one of the bill's prime sponsors, has
described the history of the enactment of the SMCRA as a primer
for politicians who wish to learn how to frustrate enactment of legis-
lation that expresses the clear will of the majority of Congress.-5 Re-
51. 47 Fed. Reg. 560 (1982).
52. 30 U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. III 1979).
53. Id § 1252(c), 1252(e).
54. Id § 1252(b), 1252(c).
55. Udall, The Enactment of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 in
Retrospect, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 553 (1979).
The history of the Act would serve as a textbook for any national legislator desiring
view of the legislative history need not encompass the full breadth of
congressional activity over a decade. However, the fundamental
conclusions of Congress about the need for legislation controlling
coal mining and the manner in which the federal government ad-
dressed the difficulties encountered in implementing SMCRA should
be explored.
A. Establishing the Existence of a Problem
Section 101 of SMCRA,56 the statement of congressional intent,
provides the fundamental conclusion of Congress about the impact
of coal mining and the concomitant need for federal legislation. Sec-
tion 101 specifies that surface mining had created widespread distur-
bance of commerce and the public welfare by irreparably harming
the utility of land for commercial, industrial, residential, recrea-
tional, agricultural, and forestry uses through shoddy surface mining
practices. Erosion, landslides, floods, water pollution, and the crea-
tion of virtual wastelands attributable to the coal mining industry
had lowered, if not endangered, the quality of life for plants, ani-
mals, and humans. Additionally, destructive effects of mining offset
actions taken to conserve and protect soil, water and other natural
resources.
57
The land use problem identified in section 101(c) relates to the
nation's industrial, residential, and agricultural development. Con-
gress saw adverse environmental impacts, while depicted as local in
nature, as undermining other governmental interests and programs.
Conclusions obtained as a result of numerous field tours and the tes-
timony of many witnesses at congressional hearings supplied the ba-
sis for these findings.58
to thwart the clear will of the majority of the Congress... [A] legislative endeavor
involving 183 days of hearings and legislative consideration, eighteen days of House
action, three House-Senate Conferences and reports, eleven Committee Reports, two
Presidential vetoes, approximately fifty-two recorded votes in the House and Senate,
and the machinations (and statesmen-like conduct) of three Presidents is an activity
ripe for scholarly analysis, let alone the stuff for a pretty good novel.
Id
56. 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. III 1979).
57. Id § 1201(c). Subsection (c) provides the following:
(c) many surface mining operations result in disturbances of surface areas that bur-
den and adversely affect commerce and the public welfare by destroying or diminish-
ing the utility of land for commercial, industrial, residential, recreational,
agricultural, and forestry purposes, by causing erosion and landslides, by contribut-
ing to floods, by polluting the water, by destroying fish and wildlife habitats, by im-
pairing natural beauty, by damaging the property of citizens, by creating hazards
dangerous to life and property, by degrading the quality of life in local communities,
and by counteracting governmental programs and efforts to conserve soil, water, and
other natural resources.
Id
58. For example, The Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs reported the
following in 1973:
Coal surface mining activities, in particular, have imposed large social and environ-
mental costs on the public at large in many areas of the country in the form of un-
The SMCRA seeks to establish a national program to end this
nationwide destruction of the country's land and water resources, al-
though Congress viewed a strong regulatory program as timely and
essential for national economic reasons as well.5 9 Because Congress
anticipated a shift from petroleum to coal to supply America's en-
ergy needs, section 101(d) reflects an intent that environmental val-
ues and the health and safety of the public not be sacrificed to supply
cheap energy.60 While some have suggested that section 101(d)
could serve as an expression of congressional intent to limit the strin-
gency of the regulatory program and encourage the wholesale shift
to coal,6 ' a letter by James Schlesinger, Assistant to President Carter,
cogently addresses congressional concern for the overall welfare of
the nation in the long-term.62 Mr. Schlesinger noted that adequate
safeguards for land-bearing coal resources harmonize with the policy
of expanded coal production. The vast coal resources of this nation
afford us the luxury of selectively choosing the areas to be mined.63
Furthermore, a national regulatory scheme for environmentally
sound coal mining would erase the uncertainties surrounding the
rules for proper mining practices. This, in turn, should create a cli-
mate conducive to greater coal production.' In a floor debate on the
SMCRA, Senator Henry Jackson echoed the position of Mr. Schles-
inger by stating that "one of the major inhibiting factors to coal de-
velopment in all coal regions of the country-East and West-is the
failure to establish federal surface mining standards. Our coal in-
reclaimed lands, water pollution, erosion, floods, slope failures, loss for fish and
wildlife resources, and a decline in natural beauty. Uncontrolled surface coal mining
in many regions has effected a stark, unjustifiable, and intolerable degradation in the
quality of life in local communities.
S. REP. No. 402, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1973).
59. Congress found that
the expansion of coal mining to meet the Nation's energy needs makes even more
urgent the establishment of appropriate standards to minimize damage to the envi-
ronment and to productivity of the soil and to protect the health and safety of the
public.
30 U.S.C. § 1201(d) (Supp. III 1979).
60. H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong,, Ist Sess. 61 (1977); reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 599.
61. See generally Gage, The Failure of the Interim Regulatory Program under the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. The Need for Flexible Controls, 81 W. VA. L.
REv. 595 (1979).
62. H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 166 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 697-98.
63. Adequate safeguards of the land are not in conflict with a policy of expanded
coal production. The Nation's coal resource is quite large and the portion of that
resource made unavailable by this legislation is extremely small .... Fortunately,
the great abundance of coal in this country allows us to declare certain areas off limit
to strip mining because of their greater value for competing purposes.
Id
64. Years of controversy over this legislation have increased the uncertainties facing
the coal industry and the prospects for relying on more coal in this country. One
particular reason I am eager to see the bill pass is, finally to create a sense of certainty
about the rules by which coal strip mining can take place.
Id
dustry must know what the guidelines are in order to be able to plan
their investments and proceed with mining. '"65
B. Developing Environmental Performance Standards
Congress followed two mutually contradictory paths in crafting
the regulatory program of SMCRA. With respect to implementa-
tion, SMCRA evolved in a manner that gave primary administrative
responsibility to the states. At the same time, consideration of sub-
stantive performance standards produced a complex set of statutory
requirements that provided little opportunity for flexibility on either
the part of the Department of the Interior or the states.
1. The Allocation of Authority Between the State and Federal
Governments. -Congress passed the Surface Mining Act against a
background of widespread, but weak, state legislation regulating
strip mining. Although states strengthened their legislation over the
decade in which federal authority was considered and passed, Con-
gress did not abandon the idea of the need for national regulatory
program.
In 1977, a Senate Report on the status of existing state mining
regulations concluded that the states tailored their regulatory pro-
grams to accommodate present mining practices rather than to incor-
porate environmental standards into the statutory framework. This
failure to recognize environmental values had caused mining prac-
tices to result in unacceptable or permanent damage and necessitated
action by the federal government.
66
Notwithstanding a continuing commitment to a federally man-
dated change in the conduct of mining, the congressional attitude
about the relationship between the states and the federal government
underwent an early and important change to allow for a clear oppor-
tunity for major state responsibility in implementing SMCRA.
The first bill to pass either house of Congress was House Bill
6482, which passed the House of Representatives on October 11,
1972.67 House Bill 6482 would have established a complete federal
regulatory program, including federal permits, which would have
been effective six months after passage of the bill.68 House Bill 6482
modeled the federal-state relationship in mining regulation after the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 69 The scheme envisioned by
65. 123 CONG. REC. 7998 (daily ed. May 19, 1977) (statement of Senator Jackson).
66. S. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1977). A congressional research service
study of state surface mining regulation supplied the basis for the conclusion in the Senate
Report that areas of inadequacy existed in both state laws and regulations as well as in the
capability of the states to enforce their laws and regulations. Id
67. 118 CONG. REC. H. 35,031-38 (daily ed. Oct. !1, 1972).
68. Id
69. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 and Supp. III 1979).
the Bill required that a complete regulatory program be imple-
mented at the federal level. Subsequently, a state could choose to
displace the federal program with a state program that met federal
standards.7° When Congress moved to consider coal mining legisla-
tion in the ninety-third Congress, a profound but subtle shift in atti-
tude could be detected. In the final form of the surface mining
legislation, both the Senate7' and the House72 proposed to greatly
enhance state participation.73
The new, proposed mining legislation created an interim, fed-
eral regulatory program which, while providing for early implemen-
tation of selected federal performance standards, used existing state
permit programs. Both bills strongly encouraged the states to submit
programs that would provide for state implementation of the perma-
nent and complete regulatory scheme.74 Only if a state failed to sub-
mit such a program or have its submitted program approved by the
Secretary would a federal regulatory program, including federal per-
mits, be put in place. Both Senate Bill 425 and House Bill 1150 elim-
inated the federal permit system, except as a "last resort.
' 75
Congress did not follow the prevailing model for federal envi-
ronmental regulatory programs, which, in the case of the early bills,
meant a full federal regulatory program within six months of the
Act's passage. Instead, Congress moved to an interim program
based on state procedures with a substantial period of time allowed
for the states to assume primary responsibility for implementation of
the full program. This approach to the state-federal relationship re-
mained constant through the succeeding years during which the leg-
islation was considered. There was, however, substantial evolution
in other areas of the statute, which impeded the achievement of state
primacy in the first years of SMCRA's implementation.76
The legislative history does not reveal specific reasons for this
shift; however, several possible reasons can be deduced. First, the
members of Congress believed that the site-specific nature of the en-
70. 118 CONG. REC. H. 35,031 (daily ed. Oct. II, 1972).
71. S. 425, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. REP. No. 402, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
72. H.R. 11500, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1522, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1973).
73. To understand the nature of the shift, one must recognize that the permitting process
functions centrally in any complete regulatory program. In the case of SMCRA, it operated as
the key mechanism for implementing the bill's objective to "effect changes in those mining
practices which result in unacceptable or permanent environmental damage." S. REP. No.
128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1977).
74. S. 425 stated, "Each State ... shall submit to the Secretary, by the end of the eight-
een month period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, a State program which
demonstrates that such state has the capability of carrying out the provisions of this Act and
meeting its purposes . H. CONF. REP. No. 1522, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess., § 503(a) at 20
(1973).
75. S. REP. No. 402, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1973).
76. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
vironmental and social impacts of strip mining required a high level
of state involvement.77 Second, while many states remained hostile
to the idea of any federal legislation, others eagerly anticipated the
legislation, provided that they were permitted to assume major re-
sponsibility.7 Third, the Nixon and Ford Administrations clearly
favored enhanced and strengthened state participation in adminis-
tration of federal programs. 79 Notwithstanding a well-documented
history of ineffective regulation, the political climate and the site-
specific nature of mining problems led Congress to adopt an ap-
proach relying on a strong state role in regulation.
2. The Regulatory Requirements. -The manner in which Con-
gress addressed the central substantive requirements of SMCRA
complicated the state-federal relationship. The legislative history of
these requirements demonstrates the reason for their inconsistency
with the previous pattern of the state-federal relationship in environ-
mental regulations. Congressional debate of the proposed mining
legislation shows concern for two fundamental issues: first, the pos-
sible absolute prohibition of mining in certain areas; and second,
when mining is permitted, the content of environmental protection
criteria and the method of statutorily setting forth these criteria. In
addressing these two issues, Congress developed an increasingly
complex and rigorous legal structure that provided few opportunities
for state departures as the states assumed primacy in SMCRA's
implementation.
The SMCRA resulted from an effort to ban strip mining alto-
gether. In 1971, Congressman Ken Hechler of West Virginia, with
over one-hundred co-sponsors, introduced a bill in the House of
Representatives that would have banned all strip mining six months
after passage.80 As the legislation progressed through subsequent
years of refinement in the legislative process, absolute prohibitions
on strip mining yielded to increasingly precise delineation of limited
77. See 30 U.S.C. § 1201(0 (Supp. III 1979), which provides as follows: "[Blecause of
the diversity, climate, biologic, chemical, and other physical conditions in areas subject to
mining operations, the primary governmental responsibility for developing, authorizing, issu-
ing, and enforcing regulations for surface mining and reclamation operations subject to this
Act should rest with the states." Id
78. Regulation of Surface Mining. Hearings before the Subcomtr. on Ent. and Subcomm.
on Mines and Mining of the House ComnL on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
879-84 (1973) (statement of Walter Heine, then Deputy Secretary for Mines and Land Protec-
tion, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources).
79. In a letter dated February 6, 1975, President Gerald Ford set forth the Administra-
tion's concern that even S. 425 "could (1) lead to unnecessary Federal preemption, displace-
ment or duplication of State regulatory activities, and (2) discourage States from assuming an
active permanent regulatory role .. " S. REP. No. 28, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 236 (1975).
80. Dunlop, An Analysis of the Legislative History of the Surface Mining Control and Rec-
lamation Act of 1975, 21 ROcKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Legisla-
tive History].
areas within which mining would be proscribed or would be allowed
only pursuant to the most rigorous controls.
Tracing the fate of the attempt at an outright ban illustrates how
the continuous process of refinement produced ever more complex
statutory language. The ban proposal never emerged from the
House Committee. Nonetheless, House Bill 6482, as passed by the
House of Representatives, prohibited mining on slopes greater than
twenty degrees from the horizontal unless the mining operator could
affirmatively show both the unlikelihood of resulting environmental
damage and the actuality of post-mining reclamation." Although
House Bill 6482 purported to allow steep slope mining, many inter-
preted it as a defacto ban on steep-slope mining82 because of the
impossibility of making the required showings. The bill, as finally
enacted in late 1974 by the ninety-third Congress, further elaborated
the controls on steep slope mining by providing for additional spe-
cific performance standards that added emphasis to the general lan-
guage of House Bill 6482.83 The Senate refused to accept an effort
by the House of Representatives to allow a variance from the re-
quirement that mined land be returned to the approximate original
contour in certain steep slope situations.8 4 Congress maintained the
posture of theoretically allowing steep-slope mining but only with
constraints that made it practically impossible through the next con-
sideration of the bill during the first session of the ninety-fourth
Congress.
However, when the ninety-fifth Congress considered strip mine
legislation during early 1977, the adoption of a variance procedure
that had been previously suggested for mountain-top removal min-
ing by the ninety-third Congress substantially weakened the poten-
tial restriction on steep-slope mining caused by strict performance
standards.8 5 This procedure essentially removed the requirement
that steep-slope mined land be restored to approximate original con-
81. H.R. 6482 provides,
Provided, That no such overburden will be removed from slopes greater than 20 de-
grees from the horizontal, unless the operator can affirmatively demonstrate that sed-
imentation, landslides, or acid or mineralized water pollution can be feasibly
prevented and that the areas can be reclaimed as required by the provisions of this
Act.
STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES, 92d CONG.,
2D SEss., CONGRESS AND THE NATION'S ENVIRONMENT 203 (Comm. Print 1973).
82. Id
83. In support of this prohibition, Hechler argued,
The effect of the 20-degree amendment would have been to save Appalachia and the
more mountainous areas throughout the Nation where the effects of strip mining of
coal are the most devastating. The 20-degree amendment is no concept plucked out
of nowhere, but is in face a well-established and reasoned approach which has been
well thought-out over the years.
Id at 28.
84. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1522, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., §§ 515(c) & (d), at 39-41 (1974).
85. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(e) (Supp. III 1979).
tour, provided the mining site is subsequently used for a beneficial
purpose; it also mitigated the impact of certain other performance
standards. The progress of the mining legislation through the House
and Senate illustrates one of the ways in which congressional com-
promise affects agency performance. The proponents of steep-slope
mining successfully defeated the outright ban, while permitting high-
ly restrictive controls over such mining. The proponents expected
that the responsible regulators would be sufficiently flexible in apply-
ing these controls to avoid the prohibition of mining. On the other
hand, opponents of steep-slope mining abandoned the prohibition
upon the expectation that the controls would be strictly applied and
thus prohibit much, if not all, steep-slope mining. This circumstance
will effectively prevent those charged with implementing the statute
from responding to congressional intent.
The foregoing discussion illustrates a persistent theme in SM-
CRA's development. Congress would initially consider a simple and
stringent limitation or prohibition on mining and then gradually
move away from that position by subjecting the regulatory agency to
extensive, precise, and rigid criteria. One commentator expresses the
following on this phenomenon:
It is unclear whether the opponents or proponents of the leg-
islation have gained more from the repeated veto actions and con-
tinuing consideration of the Federal strip mine bill. . . . It
appears, however, that each time Congress reassesses this legisla-
tion those additional variances granted to the industry are bal-
anced by more precise specificity in both language and legislative
history, thus neutralizing industry enthusiasm for the legislation,
if not stimulating increased opposition to it.
8 6
A number of other areas illustrate the pattern found in the steep-
slope provisions of the Act. For example, in protecting prime farm
land, 7 alluvial valley floors 8 and hydrologic systems,8 9 Congress
retreated from an absolute prohibition on mining by adopting in-
creasingly detailed specificiations governing the manner of mining.
In addition to considering whether to allow mining in certain
circumstances, Congress had to develop environmental protection
standards controlling the mining in areas where the SMCRA permit-
ted mining. Certain general issues emerge from the legislative his-
tory. Several of these issues, including the purpose of the federal
standards, the relationship between specific federal performance
standards, and state responsibility for implementing and enforcing
those standards provide a backdrop for examining SMCRA's
86. 1975 Legislative History, supra note 80, at 28.
87. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(7), 1260(d) (Supp. III 1979).
88. Id § 1265(b)(10), 1260(b)(5).
89. Id., § 1263(b)(10).
scheme of performance standards and the extent to which the
scheme should be applied in all mining situations.
Congress designed the SMCRA standards to prevent degrada-
tion of the environment during active mining operations and to as-
sure the restoration of land to pre-mining quality. The goal of
reclamation is advanced not only by the legislative prohibition of
mining in areas that are incapable of being adequately restored after
mining, but is also furthered by the specific standards for proper rec-
lamation work.9" Even in the absence of a specific prohibition in the
Act, mining will not be permitted at sites where mining activity and
environmental protection are mutually exclusive. Congress thor-
oughly addressed the issue of environmental protection because,
with few exceptions, it viewed mining as a temporary use of land. In
order to prevent this temporary use from destroying long-term bene-
ficial uses of a site, Congress incorporated specific environmental
goals into the permit approval process and the standards for proper
mining practices. 9'
Reconciling federally mandated, nationwide environmental
protection standards with state administrative primacy and the site-
specific nature of mining caused a problem that Congress dealt with
minimally and only through consideration of two separate issues:
the detail of the federal statutory standards and the permissible ex-
tent of the statutory language for granting variances. If Congress
opted for very general performance standards and broad variances,
then states could assume the regulatory leadership in adapting them
to particular local conditions. If, however, Congress articulated the
standards with detail and little opportunity for variances, then the
state primacy role would, in substance, serve the congressional
purpose.
Difficulty surrounded the resolution of the statutory detail issue.
Members fully recognized that generality in the definition and
description of protection goals would afford the states substantial
freedom within which to continue their weak regulatory require-
ments-the state of affairs that the federal law was designed to
change 9 2-and allow for much agency discretion. Furthermore, as
Congress retreated from specific efforts to ban mining on environ-
mentally sensitive land, it added detailed statutory language to con-
trol the conduct of mining on those lands. In addition, the
importance of some issues, such as approximate original contour,
permitted little room for flexibility.
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90. S. REP. No. 402, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1973).
91. H.R. REP. No. 95, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1975).
92. H.R. REP. No. 1445, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1975).
93. Id at 48-5 1.
Congress emphatically rejected the idea of giving the states the
power to grant operator variances from the SMCRA performance
standards. Congress expressed the fear that, while a broad delega-
tion of power to the states would harmonize with the goals of feder-
alism and site-specific application of mining regulation, states would
grant variances too generously. Congress considered the environ-
mental performance standards embodied in SMCRA too important
to be rendered meaningless through lax state implementation, 94 and,
therefore allowed only very limited variances to the performance
standards. The use of precise language to describe the nature of the
variance95 illustrates congressional refusal to give the states flex-
ibility to adapt SMCRA's performance standards to their diverse en-
vironments. Thus, while section 101(f) of SMCRA nominally
recognizes the need for site-specific application of mining regula-
tion, 96 the statute also sets forth numerous specific performance stan-
dards with no suggested mechanism for a state to vary from those
standards other than section 505 of the Act. Section 505 only allows
the states to adopt standards that are more stringent than those in
SMCRA.
97
The legislative reports on SMCRA expressed the success that
Congress believed it had achieved in meeting the problem of recon-
ciling national requirements with local conditions and limitations.98
Congress felt that the avoidance of excessive detail in the SMCRA
requirements made the performance standards flexible. SMCRA
supposedly reflects a middle ground between an overly broad dele-
gation of authority to an agency and the burdensome detail charac-
terizing state mining legislation. Congress recognized that overly
detailed legislation often fails to fully implement legislative goals, as
was demonstrated by the history of state coal mining regulation.
The excessive detail of state mining programs was, however, attrib-
uted to the rules and regulations promulgated by state agencies. 99
Thus, although Congress paid lip-service to the concept of state-
formed standards in section 1201(f) of the Act"°° and established a
state-federal relationship which enhanced that concept by providing
for state primacy in implementation of SMCRA's requirements, in
developing actual standards, Congress did not explicitly provide
mechanisms for recognizing state differences. Ironically and in spite
of the intention to employ specificity to respond to local concerns,10
94. S. REP. No. 28, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1977).
95. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
96. 30 U.S.C., § 1201(f) (Supp. III 1979).
97. Id § 1255.
98. H.R. REP. No. 95, supra note 91, at 79.
99. Id
100. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (Supp. 111 1979).
101. The concern over requiring a return to approximate original contour and the increas-
the congressional use of highly detailed environmental performance
standards and the clear limitation on variances precluded any mean-
ingful state-by-state flexibility.
3. Developing an Enforcement Program. -SMCRA's enforce-
ment provisions also reflect unnecessary rigidity attributable to the
detail of the statutory language. Congress perceived the enforce-
ment provisions as an essential aspect of the regulatory scheme, par-
ticularly in establishing a workable state and federal relationship in
mining regulations; however, the language of the enforcement provi-
sions of SMCRA, as it evolved during the legislative process, did not
support that relationship.
The enforcement and inspection provisions in the 1974 Confer-
ence Committee Report'02 are similar to those that Congress finally
signed into law three years later. Having fashioned an elaborate sys-
tem for supposedly accommodating state and federal interests in the
administration of the regulatory program, Congress theoretically
had to fashion an enforcement scheme which reinforced the accom-
modation. Accordingly, federal inspection -and enforcement activi-
ties structurally reflected the differences in the role of the federal
government during the interim and the permanent programs.
During the initial stages of developing the proper balance be-
tween SMCRA requirements and state needs and conditions, direct
authority for mining regulation rests with the federal government.
10 3
While the mining program in this interim period operates through
the framework of existing state administrative and permitting
processes, the Department of Interior's Office of Surface Mining
must maintain a federal enforcement program that includes inspec-
tions and enforcement actions.'" Section 521 of SMCRA, not state
administrative law and procedure, governs federal enforcement for
the interim period.' The states use the interim period to develop
and submit a program for the state's assumption of primary author-
ity for surface mining regulation within the state. If the state obtains
approval from the Department of Interior for their mining program,
the federal government assumes an oversight role in administration
and enforcement. °6
Congress recognized that problems of unnecessary and wasteful
duplication could arise from the dual enforcement program of the
ingly detailed language of the statute resulted largely from the regional concern of the Appa-
lachian states.
102. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1522, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 43-51 (1974).
103. 33 U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. III 1979).
104. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1522, supra note 102, at 43-51.
105. 30 U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. III 1979). See also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1522, supra note
102, at 43-51.
106. 30 U.S.C. § 1252(e) (Supp. III 1979).
interim period because the federal program would overlap state ac-
tivity.107 The failure of the states to vigorously enforce state mining
regulations demonstrated to Congress the crucial importance of the
interim period as a smooth transition from ineffective state programs
to the uniform and equitable SMCRA mining program. The addi-
tion of the federally mandated performance standards, federal funds
for enforcement activities, and the expertise of the Office of Surface
Mining, should foster enforcement during the interim period at the
level of effectiveness envisioned for permanent program.'08
In the enforcement and inspection scheme, Congress did two
things to insure the goal of improved state enforcement programs.
First, Congress attempted to limit the discretionary nature of en-
forcement actions by mandating action by the inspector during an
inspection.0 9 Second, and equally important, SMCRA explicitly
provides that no state program can be approved for primacy unless
the program has enforcement and inspection provisions similar to
those set fcrth in the federal act." 0
Congress intended, in the enforcement provisions of SMCRA,
to adopt a rigorous scheme that would also fit into the overall struc-
ture established for state and federal relations. Inevitably, especially
during the interim program with its provisions for direct federal in-
spection and enforcement, conflicts arose between the states and the
federal government.
This discussion of the language and legislative history of SM-
CRA suggests that Congress, in designing the regulatory program,
chose to simultaneously follow two different paths. With respect to
the procedural question of allocating responsibility between the fed-
eral government and the states, Congress chose a route that maxi-
mized the opportunity for state responsibility. However, when
Congress addressed substantive issues, such as performance stan-
dards and enforcement techniques, its desire to assure an end to
.identified national problems precluded state leeway to adjust the
statute's precise and detailed directives. Accordingly, literal imple-
mentation of the substantive provisions of SMCRA necessarily
posed challenges to achieving the mandated state-federal
relationship.
107. S. REP. No. 28, supra note 94, at 180.
108. H.R. REP. No. 95, supra note 95, at 118. "For a number of predictable reasons-
including insufficient funding and the tendency for State agencies to be protective of local
industry-State enforcement has in the past often fallen short of the vigor necessary to assure
adequate protection of the environment." Id
109. Section 1267(c) details inspection intervals and requires that reports of all inspections
be filed. 30 U.S.C. § 1267(c) (Supp. III 1979). Section 127 1(a) details the options of an inspec-
tor when a violation is noted at a site. Id § 1271(a). The inspector's only discretionary power
is to determine the immediacy of the danger to health and safety from the violation, but even
that is subject to SMCRA guidelines. Id § 1291(8).
110. 1d § 1253(a), § 1268(i), and § 1271(d).
IV. Implementation of the New Law
After enactment of SMCRA, tensions emerged between the
state primacy goal and the implementation of performance stan-
dards and enforcement provisions.1 1 ' The detailed and mandatory
nature of important SMCRA provisions made it virtually impossible
for OSM to achieve all of the central themes of the congressional
purpose. The internal tensions created by the statutory language of
SMCRA confronted the Department of Interior as it tried to draft
the regulations for interim mining programs and then began to apply
the regulations in the field. The Department of Interior attempted,
to the extent possible, to literally implement the statute's conflicting
purposes. The inflexibility of the statutory language afforded little
opportunity for OSM to develop a program that would avoid conflict
and also reflect congressional intent. In a few instances, however,
when the statutory language was sufficiently flexible and events re-
quired it, OSM attempted to develop a regulatory program that de-
parted somewhat from congressional purpose to avoid unnecessary
conflict or to meet policy objectives. Because the permanent pro-
gram contained even more detailed statutory language than the in-
terim program, OSM encountered a more difficult task in attempting
to accommodate the conflicting purposes. The attempted accommo-
dation ultimately failed.
A. The Interim Regulations
Two issues clearly emerged in the drafting of the interim regula-
tions' 2 -the regulatory description of the state-federal relationship
and the breadth of the substantive environmental protection stan-
dards to be applied during the interim period.
Under the Act, a period of up to thirty-four months could elapse
before a permanent state or federal program would exist to imple-
ment the Act's provisions." 3 The Act also required promulgation of
regulations establishing an interim program of federal environmen-
tal protection standards, federal inspection, and federal enforcement
within ninety days of enactment." 4 Although Congress considered
the role of the interim program at length the regulatory substance of
the program was crucial because the interim phase would define crit-
111. See generally COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IS-
SUES SURROUNDING THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT (1979).
112. The regulations for the initial regulatory program were published in proposed form
for public comment in the FEDERAL REGISTER on September 7, 1977. Public hearings were
held in five cities during the period September 20-22 for the purpose of soliciting further public
comment. The interim program regulations were published in final form in the FEDERAL
REGISTER on December 13, forty days beyond the statutory date of November 3, 1977.
113. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
114. 30 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (Supp. IIl 1979). See also supra note 90.
ical issues for both the federal and state governments and set the
stage for regulatory development of the permanent program.
1. The State-Federal Relationshlp. -The interim regulatory
program functions as a hybrid creation because it provides for state
administration of federal standards through existing state permitting
systems and also provides for state and federal enforcement of those
standards.' ' -1
Although the states played an informal role in drafting the in-
terim program regulations, through ad hoc participation in the work
of the Department of the Interior, state participation cannot be char-
acterized as establishing the federal interim environmental perform-
ance standards within state legal structures. The gap in state-level
involvement in drafting the interim regulations created several legal
and practical problems. A key issue was whether or not the direction
to the states contained in section 502 of the Act," 6 regarding state
issued permits, constituted a violation of the tenth amendment. 117 A
second legal problem associated with the congressional scheme de-
rived from the states' concern that, even if Congress could constitu-
tionally direct them to issue permits containing particular federally
mandated conditions, attached, the permits might not be authorized
by state law. Pragmatically, many states questioned their capacity to
administer and enforce the new requirements in so short a time, es-
pecially if, as they believed, the program required changes in state
enabling legislation.
The agency's first response to the congressional directive, re-
flected in early drafts of the interim program regulations, placed a
duty on the states to issue permits that required specific compliance
with the federal performance standards." I8 If adopted as final, these
regulations would have occasioned the political anger of the states
and generated immediate litigation based on the tenth amendment.
The Department, therefore, ultimately rejected these proposals and
reverted to proposing hortatory language, urging, but not compel-
ling, the states to impose the interim performance standards.' The
115. 30 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (Supp. III 1979).
116. Id
117. The tenth amendment states, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively or to the
people." U.S. CO NST. amend. X. Much of the litigation involving SMCRA has been based on
the tenth amendment; however, it has been the performance standards that have been chal-
lenged, not the administrative allocation of implementing authority. See Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining Assn., 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
118. Section 710.4(b) provides, "The states are responsible for issuing permits ... to in-
sure compliance with initial performance standards .. " Section 720.12 provides, "The Act
contemplates that the state will enforce the performance standards." See 42 Fed. Reg. 44920
(1977).
119. "[I]f a state is enforcing the performance standards ... that state shall incorporate
terms in . . .permits that comply with those standards." 30 C.F.R. § 720.12(a) (1981).
final form of the regulations did not specify when the Department of
the Interior would require a state to incorporate performance stan-
dards into the state mine-permit process during the interim period.
Additionally, the final regulations gave no guidance on what "terms"
a state should require in their permits. 2 '
Although the statutory language clearly specifies the legal re-
sponsibility of states during the interim program,' 2' the federal gov-
ernment did not confront the states on the issue directly because of
the legal and political objectionability that would result from a lit-
eral application of the regulations. Beyond the legal problem, the
most rigorous application of the statute's language would have con-
flicted with what the states believed they had gained in the long leg-
islative battle for state primacy. The rather sparse statutory
language allowed an accommodation of the realities of the state-fed-
eral relationship in the interim regulations. 22 Furthermore, the ap-
proach reflected the strong congressional preference for a state-lead
program. Although the congressional interest in a state-lead pro-
gram had focused on the permanent program, and for the interim
had been more towards federal leadership, the decision by the
agency not to articulate in regulations the maximum exercise of the
federal power was well-received by the states.
Although the process avoided the constitutional conflict, the
statutory requirement that states insure operator compliance with the
federal performance standards123 remained the basis of the interim
program and, therefore, had to be implemented. The pre-existing
state mining programs provided the structure for the interim imple-
mentation of SMCRA's performance standards; therefore, the fed-
eral government and the states had the option of implementing
SMCRA's interim program on an ad hoc basis, dependent upon
practice and attitude of each of the several states. The highly de-
tailed and extensive nature of the performance standards that the
interim program required the states to impose on operators and the
ever-present specter of federal enforcement made the development
of a workable federal-state relationship more difficult. Thus, precise
substantive standards in the Act inconsistent with the Act's state-led
concept, frustrated successful implementation of the scheme for fed-
eral-state relations from the beginning.
2. The Interim Performance Standards. -For a totally new
program being established on a tight schedule, SMCRA generated
120. Id
121. 30 U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. III 1979). See also supra notes 66-79 and accompanying
text.
122. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
123. 30 U.S.C. § 1252 (Supp. III 1979).
an extraordinary number of congressional mandated performance
standards to be implemented by the states and the federal govern-
ment during the interim period. The performance standards, while
scattered in different sections of the statute, are concentrated in sec-
tion 515124 for surface mining and section 516 for deep mining.1
25
Section 515 occupies more than five pages of the United States Code
and provides more than twenty-five detailed requirements for recla-
mation. 26 The legislative history suggests that a number of strong
congressional concerns led to this result. These concerns include a
desire for a national, minimum standard and a desire to prohibit
mining unless total restoration of the land could be insured after
mining ceased.
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In considering SMCRA for over five years, however, Congress
failed to recognize its work product as simply an accumulation of an
extraordinary amount of detailed technical information about min-
ing and a transformation of that knowledge into statutory require-
ments for the industry. In addition, continued debate about
particular issues, coupled with reconsideration and compromise,
produced a constantly refined legislative product characterized by
attention to infinitesimal detail. Congress did not foresee that this
fine attention to every nuance of reclamation would affect achieve-
ment of other purposes of the statute, especially the design for state-
federal relationships.
In the case of both the Clean Air Act' 28 and the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act,' 29 Congress avoided the opportunity to estab-
lish lengthy and precise performance standards for achieving goals.
Instead, Congress provided the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) with rather broad language within which to develop specific
regulatory programs. Necessarily, EPA had substantial flexibility to
adapt the statute's requirements to existing conditions and to de-
velop an approach to implementation that allowed gradual adjust-
ment to the new requirements by the newly regulated industries.
30
Both the detailed, mandatory nature of SMCRA's requirements
and the accelerated, rigid nature of the implementation schedule af-
forded the agency no flexibility to adjust legislative requirements to
existing conditions in the industry and the states. By February 3,
1978, all new mines had to conform with the statute's interim pro-
gram enforcement standards, ' and three months after that existing
124. Id § 1265.
125. Id § 1266.
126. Id § 1265.
127. See supra notes 55-110 and accompanying text.
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1976 and Supp. III 1979).
129. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 and Supp. III 1979).
130. 1 GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, chs. 2, 3 (1981).
131. 30 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (Supp. III 1979).
mines had to comply.'32 A mandated federal enforcement program
overseeing both industry and the states would assure compliance.
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The schedule and requirements left minimal time for the states to
adjust their programs to serve ai. ve.hicles for the new federal stan-
dards and assured frequent confrontations over program administra-
tion in both the field and in state capitols.
Even absent the time factor, the statutory specificity of the per-
formance standards would have left neither the states nor the federal
agency the latitude to pick and choose between the mandated re-
quirements in order to fashion a program that moved more gradu-
ally toward full implementation of the federal requirements. The
tension that grew out of the process of blending existing state pro-
grams and accelerated, detailed, federally enforced performance
standards carried over to the second phase of the program-the de-
velopment of permanent program regulations.
An agency decision to implement as many of the Act's perform-
ance standards as soon as possible in the interim program worsened
the inherent statutory tension. Given the complexity of putting the
interim program in place through existing state programs and the
resultant tension at the state level, this decision only mistakenly ex-
acerbated state-federal relations to the point of substantially impair-
ing program acceptance.
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3. Consequences. -The development of detailed and
mandatory performance standards proved manageable during the
interim program precisely because the agency's flexible approach to
the state-federal relationship allowed for accommodation of merging
state abilities and interests. 13 5 In effect, the states continued their
pre-existing regulatory programs with modifications imposed only as
the states determined that their administrative capacity, technical
ability, or industry interest could absorb them. The "Heine-Calla-
ghan letter,' '1 36 in which the federal government recognized West
Virginia's primacy in applying various substantive requirements to
the mining industry in that state, best characterizes this reasonable
approach. In consequence of this approach, the majority of mining
operations conducted during the interim program, especially ones
existing prior to enactment of SMCRA, did not utilize state permits
setting forth in engineering detail the methods of meeting the federal
132. Id
133. Id § 1252(c).
134. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES SUR-
ROUNDING THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT, 4-22 (1979).
135. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
136. This letter is referred to and described in some detail in Rochow, The Far Side of
Paradox- State Regulation of the Environmental Effects ofCoal Mining, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 559,
587 (1979).
requirements. This achieved the state primacy goal of SMCRA, but
sacrificed congressional desire for immediate and rigorous imple-
mentation of the performance standards. '
While the OSM approach resolved most debates between ad-
ministrators in state capitols and OSM headquarters in Washington,
D.C., the enforcement provisions of SMCRA still permitted field
conflicts between federal and state mine inspectors. OSM, therefore,
adopted a transition enforcement policy to give the states and the
industry a period within which to adjust to the new regulatory regi-
men. The OSM transition policy significantly modified the statute's
interim enforcement program. Specifically, the transition policy al-
lowed federal inspectors to issue warnings (the statute mandates is-
suance of a notice of violation or show cause order), 138 to cite only
major violations (the statute requires enforcement against all viola-
tions), 139 to make joint inspections with state officials (the statute ap-
pears to contemplate separate functions),14° and to defer to state
inspectors (allow a state inspector to write the ticket, again contrary
to the mandatory burden the statute places on the federal inspector).
OSM's transition enforcement policy clothed its inspectors and re-
gional personnel with considerable discretion. This caused policy
variations from region to region depending on the problems in the
region. OSM's adjustments to the statute resulted in, on the one
hand, relative harmony in the field, and, on the other, legal action
brought against the agency by various citizens groups.
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The enforcement scheme in section 502 put the states and OSM
on a collision course. OSM's attempts to avoid the collision led to
significant departures in administrative application of SMCRA.
Each change by the agency attempted to lessen the tension created
by the congressional scheme and to develop a more workable rela-
tionship between the two levels of government. A rough field part-
nership began to emerge in the eastern states during the
administration of the interim program, except in the case of states
137. This accommodative approach did not satisfy Illinois and Virginia and these states
initiated litigation designed to overturn important elements of the interim program, namely
the provisions controlling the conduct of mining on prime farm lands and steep slopes. Claims
that the statute was being applied in a manner far too restrictive given the nature of mining in
those states supplied the theme for this litigation. In both suits the court concluded that the
language of the statute properly authorized the agency action. In re Surface Mining Regula-
tion Litigation (1), 452 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1978), a ff'dper curiam sub noma. National Coal
Ass'n v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
138. 30 U.S.C. § 1271(a)(2), (a)(3) (Supp. III 1979).
139. Id But see COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES
SURROUNDING THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT, 24-26 (1979) (state
officials complained about overzealous action by OSM in enforcement).
140. Compare the procedures for state inspections, 30 U.S.C. § 1267 (Supp. III 1979), with
those for federal inspections, id § 1271. The provisions for prior notice to the person in-
spected, and for when and for what reasons inspection may take place indicates that Congress
envisioned separate inspections.
141. See, e.g., Council of S. Mountain v. Andrus, No. 79-1821 (D.D.C. 1979).
continuing to object to any federal presence in the coal fields.' 42
B. Permanent Program Regulations
OSM had less success in developing a permanent regulatory
program that avoided the strains between the state-federal relation-
ship and the performance standards. The permanent program regu-
lations finally adopted on March 13, 1979, initially and most
dramatically illustrate this conflict. 43 The task of coherent integra-
tion of the divergent congressional purposes continues. 44 An ex-
haustive analysis of the final permanent program regulations exceeds
the scope of this article; however, brief attention to several issues
illustrates that the conflict between the two goals arose from statu-
tory language. Furthermore, the statutory language establishing the
permanent program contained far more detail than the interim pro-
gram and, therefore, did not allow for interpretive flexibility as a
means for agency accommodation of this conflict. OSM created
mechanisms to resolve the tensions in the federal-state relationship
without explicit support in the statutory language.
L The State-Federal Relationshp. -SMCRA approached the
issue of state primacy quite differently for the permanent program
than it had for the interim program. State primacy under the interim
program received scant attention in only a few phrases in section
502(h) of SMCRA.145 State primacy, however, occupied a more im-
portant position in the permanent program. A number of congres-
sional interests were at stake as the states moved toward primacy.
142. An interesting parallel situation is the development of the federal lands program
under section 523 of SMCRA. 30 U.S.C. § 1273 (Supp. III 1979). As early as 1973 Congress
recognized the unique administrative problems presented by checkerboard and intermingled
federal and nonfederal lands in the western states. S. REP. No. 402, supra note 91, at 20-21.
Early proposals provided for a joint federal-state system of management, but withheld from
the states the authority to fully regulate mining and reclamation activities on federal lands.
The delegation of legal authority by one jurisdiction to the other would have established this
system. Not until 1977, in response to correspondence from Secretary of the Interior Andrus,
did the idea of a cooperative agreement emerge as the mechanism for achieving coordinated
management. Hearings on S. 7 before the Subcom. on Public Lands and Resources of Sen.
Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., ist Sess. 7 (1977). Regardless of the
mechanism chosen by Congress, at no point did it consider how to merge the implementation
of this mechanism with the substantive and scheduling requirements of SMCRA established
elsewhere. Again this difficult problem of integration would lead Governor Edward Herschler
of Wyoming to comment "SMCRA looks to the states to take the lead in implementing a
national program .... [Tihe Federal Office of Surface Mining has jeopardized this funda-
mental failure of the Federal Act with its performance to date. 125 CONG. REc. S. 12361
(daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979).
143. 30 C.F.R. ch. VII (1981).
144. Substantial revisions to the regulatory requirements of the permanent program now
exist in some stage of consideration. See 47 Fed. Reg. 1709 (1982), which lists numerous
changes to be considered during calendar year 1982.
145. 30 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (Supp. III 1979).
These interests included rapid implementation of a full regulatory
program, full environmental protection, and effective enforcement.
Section 503 of SMCRA' 46 contains the fundamental require-
ments for state primacy. Section 503 imposes upon the states the
burden of demonstrating the following capabilities of state law to the
Department of the Interior: to set standards for coal operators as
stringent as the federal performance standards; 47 to issue the same
types of sanctions that OSM may issue under federal law to enforce
compliance with the performance standards; 48 and to implement an
effective permit system for coal operators that incorporates the per-
formance standards. 49 Section 503, in combination with the legisla-
tive history,150 led OSM to develop an approach that virtually
required the states to reproduce the federal scheme for regulating
coal mining before they could expect approval for primacy. OSM's
decision led to very detailed regulations setting forth requirements
for, inter alia, the content of state programs, schedules for decision
processes, and criteria for approval or disapproval. This action
markedly contrasted with the approach taken in the regulations de-
fining state-federal relations during the interim program, and the
states found the action highly unacceptable. Consequently, the liti-
gation challenging the propriety of the definition of the state-federal
relationship reached unprecedented proportions in the field of envi-
ronmental law. ' 5'
Two issues addressed by the permanent program regulations il-
lustrate the nature of the states' objection. The first concerned how
closely the state program had to parallel the federal law and regula-
tions. The permanent regulations promulgated by OSM required
that, to be considered "in accordance with" the standards in SM-
CRA and thereby eligible for departmental approval for primacy, a
state mining program be as stringent as the relevant minimum stan-
dards of SMCRA.' 52 The states' vigorously argued both before the
courts and the agency that this language had the practical effect of
forcing the states to duplicate the federal program without regard to
either local circumstances or the states' role as primary implementors
of the permanent program. The courts rejected this contention'53
146. Id § 1253. Importantly, numerous other sections of SMCRA contain language that
constrains the design of the state program.
147. 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
148. Id § 1253(a)(2).
149. Id § 1253(a)(4).
150. See supra notes 55-110 and accompanying text.
151. See In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 653 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
152. 30 C.F.R. § 730 (1979).
153. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 653 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
precisely because OSM's strict interpretation of SMCRA complied
with the congressional intention that
[aln approved State program require[ldl (1) a State law consistent
with the Federal law and (2) State rules and regulations consistent
with the Secretary's regulations. The Conference report retains
the basic principle that the federal laws and regulations are mini-
mum standards which may be exceeded by the states.
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Notwithstanding the judicial approval of the administrative in-
terpretation of congressional intent, the rigorous standard of compa-
rability continued to provoke the states and gave rise to further
efforts by OSM to allow greater freedom for state departure from the
precise requirements of SMCRA.
A second aspect of the permanent program regulations that the
states considered as negating their appropriate role concerned the
expeditious schedule by which Congress required the existence of a
complete regulatory program, preferably administered by a state.
SMCRA required that the full program be operative no later than
June 3, 1980.' To allow for orderly procedures prior to that date,
SMCRA required states to submit programs for approval no later
than February 3, 1979. 56 Unfortunately, a series of events and cir-
cumstances delayed the permanent program regulations until March
13, 1979. 57 The obvious inability of the states to submit programs
within the contemplated schedule and of the Secretary of the De-
partment of the Interior to review the submissions led the agency to
consider the extent to which it could issue regulations that varied
from the statutes. The agency developed rationales for variations
and at least moved the date for submittal of state programs to Au-
gust 3, 1979."58 The extraordinary time restrictions, accommodation
however, caused several states to institute challenges in court once
again. Upon the petition of Virginia and Illinois, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia enjoined the enforcement
of the August 3rd deadline, while not ruling on the mandatory na-
ture of the June 3, 1980 deadline. 5 9
In the permanent program regulations, OSM attempted to
achieve scrupulous adherence to the statute's mandates regarding
both time schedules and design of state program. The statute's preci-
sion in both regards provided little opportunity for flexibility and
negated the opportunity for state creativity in assuming primacy.
154. H. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1977), reprinted in, 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 600.
155. 30 U.S.C. § 1254(a).
156. Id § 1253(a).
157. For example, the requirement that consultation be carried out with the Council of
Economic Advisors resulted in delay. 44 Fed. Reg. 14908 (1979).
158. 30 C.F.R. § 731.12(a) (1981).
159. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulations Litigation, 617 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
The states found this result highly unacceptable since it appeared to
conflict with the proper role of the states as they understood it in the
implementation of SMCRA. 6 ° Perhaps some states even considered
the primacy process as one calculated to prevent states from submit-
ting approvable programs and thereby allowing the federal govern-
ment to assume primacy in administering the Act.16 1 An
examination of the content of the permanent program substantive
regulations illustrates how the states could possibly have reached this
perception.
2 The Substantive Standards. -The permanent program per-
formance standards continued the pattern of the interim program.
In an effort to articulate precisely the full requirements of SMCRA's
regulatory performance goals, the regulations repeated and elabo-
rated the detail of the interim regulations. Beyond the detail for per-
formance standards, however, the regulations adopted new language
covering bonding, 62 contents of applications for permits, 163 and pro-
cedures for approving permits. 1' The federal regulations had not
addressed these topics during the interim program, but the Act
seemed to clearly require them as part of the permanent program. 165
As OSM considered the total impact of the rigorous require-
ments of the permanent program regulations it became apparent that
the states would vigorously resist the overwhelming burden of man-
dating literal compliance with all of these regulations. Accordingly,
the proposed regulations contained the so-called "state window"'
166
by which the states could request and receive a variance from the
methods specified in a regulation if the state met the relevant per-
formance standard. A state could, under this proposal, adapt the
primacy program it had submitted to the Department of the Interior
to its own specific circumstances. If the state could demonstrate that
the alternative method could still capably achieve the minimum na-
tional performance standards of SMCRA, the Department would
not deny approval of the state program because of failure to utilize
the precise method specified in the regulations. The final regulations
adopted the "state window" concept.
Section 731.13,167 containing the "state window" regulation,
was an extraordinary regulatory development by OSM that provided
160. See generally COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Is-
SUES SURROUNDING THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL AND RECLAMATION ACT, 4-22 (1979).
161. Id
162. 30 C.F.R. §§ 800-09 (1981).
163. Id §§ 770-85.
164. Id §§ 786.95.
165. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 1257 (Supp. III 1979) (detailing the information required in an
application for a permit).
166. 43 Fed. Reg. 41,810 (1978).
167. 30 C.F.R. § 731.13 (1981)
some relief to the states from the unremitting mandatory nature of
the statutory language of SMCRA. Notably, the breadth of the
"state window" concept established a procedure for state-created
variances that could address virtually any of SMCRA's require-
ments. Moreover, and even more surprising in light of the agency's
previously rigid adherence to the statute, the variance procedure
found no explicit support in either the language of the statute, other
than the very general provision of section 201 (c)(9), or in the legisla-
tive history.'68 The "state window" concept originated, however,
from the need of the agency to reconcile the exhaustive federal regu-
latory program anticipated by SMCRA with the equally strong
states' expectation that they would primarily implement the legisla-
tive scheme. This accommodation of the states' expectation of pri-
macy, which SMCRA recognized, resulted in the establishment of a
procedure that could, unless vigorously policed, allow the destruc-
tion of the other primacy congressional goal-a nationally estab-
lished minimum set of substantive requirements for the mining of
coal.
2. Consequences. -State fear that the Department of the Inte-
rior would vigorously police the procedural requirements of the
"state window" led the states to reject it as a solution to achieving
and maintaining primacy. The states challenged the provision as too
restrictive; however, the challenges failed.'69
Exploration of the congressional reaction to OSM's failure to
resolve satisfactorily the tension between state primacy and strong
performance standards offers greater interest. In the summer of
1979, Congress, following oversight hearings, 70 became alarmed
that events were frustrating its intention that the states have primacy
in implementing SMCRA. In response, the Senate Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources reported out Senate Bill 1403. The
report proposed a change in the schedule for state program review,
removed the requirement that state programs comply with federal
regulations, and changed procedures in federal lands. 17 1 The com-
mittee report amended a bill' 7 2 offered by Senator Henry Jackson
168. This section provides the following: "Assist the States in the development of State
Programs for surface coal mining and reclamation operations which meet the requirements of
the Act, and at the same time, reflect local requirements and local environmental and agricul-
tural conditions." 30 U.S.C. § 1202(c)(9) (Supp. III 1979).
169. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 653 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
170. Implementation ofthe Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. Oversight Hear-
ings before Subcomm. on Public Lands and Resources of the Sen. Comm. on Energy and Natural
Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); Implementation of the Surface Mining Control and Rec-
lamation Act of 1977: Oversight Hearings before the Subcomm. on Energy and Env. ofthe House
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
171. S. REP. No. 271, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
172. Id
that would have only made a time schedule change to ameliorate the
consequences of the delay in the issuance of the federal permanent
regulations. '
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In debating Senate Bill 1403, Congress both reviewed OSM's
success in interpreting legislative intent regarding SMCRA and dis-
cussed the need for a significant change in congressional instruction
to the Department of the Interior.
Proponents of Senate Bill 1403 argued that the Department of
the Interior had distorted the will and intent of Congress in the im-
plementation of SMCRA and had "massaged it to the point that you
[could not] recognize it any more."1 74 It was argued that Congress
intended that each state would have the right to develop programs
addressing the special circumstances of the state. ,
75
The opponents of Senate Bill 1403 recognized that adoption of
the "state-lead" concept of the amendment would destroy the na-
tional and uniform mining program envisioned under SMCRA.
17 6
In floor debate the opponents noted that a congressional intent to
give the states complete freedom to develop their programs would
have abandoned health, safety, and environmental goals and abro-
gated any need to pass SMCRA initially. The agency promulgated
the federal regulations pursuant to and in support of the language of
the Act and its legislative history, and not in distortion of the will of
Congress. 177
The irony is clear. In the summer of 1979 Congress debated a
bill arising out of a perceived failure of OSM to follow congressional
intent while the very debate indicates that Congress had not clearly
resolved its own intent. The Senate enacted Senate Bill 1403, but the
Bill never reached the floor of the House.1 78 The inability of Con-
gress to clarify its intent, however, did not lessen the burden on the
agency to respond to continued tension between the several congres-
sional purposes.
V. Conclusion
The foregoing analysis of SMCRA and its first two years of im-
plementation by OSM demonstrates the fallacy of the argument
favoring more, not less, detail in legislative delegations of authority
to the executive branch as a means of controlling abuses of executive
power. Although Congress struck a workable balance by giving pri-
mary regulatory responsibility to the states to implement federally
173. Id
174. 125 CONG. REC. S 12,354 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979) (statement of Senator Ford).
175. 125 CONG. REC. S. 12,350-12,389 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1979).
176. Id at S. 12,350 (statement of Senator Jackson).
177. Id
178. Id at S. 12,371.
established programs, it excessively detailed environmental controls.
OSM, in trying to implement the state-lead concept in concert with
other congressional purposes, disturbed and restruck the congres-
sional balance. Finally, the course of OSM's implementation of the
interim and permanent programs illustrates that detail: (1) does not
remove ambiguity and, consequently does not remove the opportu-
nity for exercise of executive power; (2) adds emphasis and, therefore
precludes the ability not to do certain things; and (3) circumscribes
options so that legitimate interests cannot be accommodated. Con-
gress, in mandating the executive branch to carry out two conflicting
goals, gave that branch as difficult a delegation to implement as if it
had told the executive to develop a regulatory program without any
legislative guidance. The current claims of executive abuse in imple-
menting SMCRA result inevitably from overly detailed legislation.
A clearer articulation of congressional intent, not statutory amend-
ments adding further detail, can provide the cure. Simple drafting
can provide the means. The lesson of SMCRA should be that detail
in delegation may mask congressional indecision rather than clarity
of direction.
